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BOOK REVIEWS
Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed, by T. J. Mawson. London: Continuum, 
2011. ISBN: 9781441102096. 208 pages. $19.95 (paperback).
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College
In Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed, which is written as an introductory 
text on the topic of human freedom, T. J. Mawson presents a spirited 
and engaging defense of libertarianism. He opens Free Will (2–5) with 
a thought experiment about a fictitious People’s Republic of Freedom, 
which is a utopian country where everyone gets along perfectly well. This 
universal cooperation is made possible by a computer that causally deter-
mines each person’s desires, beliefs, thoughts, choices, etc., so that they 
harmonize in a utopian way. Everyone does what he or she wants, thus 
fulfilling the compatibilist conception of free will. Mawson believes that a 
person would rightly be worried about becoming a citizen of the People’s 
Republic of Freedom because joining would entail the loss of libertarian 
free will, which is a kind of freedom that Mawson seems to believe we 
desire to have.
Whether we desire it or not, Mawson is convinced that libertarianism 
captures our commonsense view of ourselves as free agents, as is evi-
denced by the following five everyday thoughts:
1. Sometimes I could do something other than what I actually do 
(what Mawson terms the Principle of Alternative Possibilities or 
Indeterminism).
2. Sometimes I’m morally responsible for what I do.
3. If I couldn’t do other than what I actually do, then I wouldn’t be 
morally responsible for what I do (what Mawson terms Incompati-
bilism).
4. If I wasn’t the ultimate author of my actions, then I wouldn’t be mor-
ally responsible for them.
5. To the extent that I did not will an action under the morally salient 
description, I am not fully morally responsible for it (174).
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Mawson believes that Indeterminism is a presumption that lies just 
below the surface of our everyday thinking (14). This presumption is a 
pre-reflective belief that seldom, if ever, comes to the surface of conscious-
ness (18, 143). Thus, when it is brought to our attention, it is not likely to 
strike all of us as something familiar and already believed (18). But what 
brings it to our attention? Mawson seems to believe that it comes to light 
in thought experiments like imaginatively rewinding time to a certain mo-
ment of choice and playing it forward again to see that different choices 
might be made on different rewindings (15). While Mawson maintains 
that such a thought experiment could not prove the truth of the presump-
tion of Indeterminism, we nevertheless have no reason to doubt the truth 
of Indeterminism unless we are thoroughgoing skeptics (15–18).
Because of considerations of space, I pass over everyday thought 2 and 
briefly summarize Mawson’s treatment of everyday thought 3 (Incom-
patibilism). Because Incompatibilism links everyday thoughts 1 and 2, 
it has less immediate support from our everyday experiences than they 
do (33, 51). But we do believe it. Mawson has a lengthy and informative 
discussion of the Consequence Argument in support of the antecedent of 
Incompatibilism. His conclusion to this discussion is that the compatibil-
ist is best advised to accept the soundness of the Argument, because the 
classical compatibilist’s (the person who believes in a conditional analysis 
of “could have done otherwise”: “I would have done otherwise, if I had 
chosen or wanted”) questioning of Rule Beta (“If there is nothing anyone 
can do to change a thing, X, and nothing anyone can do to change the 
fact that another thing, Y, is a necessary consequence of X, then there is 
nothing anyone can do to change Y”) is less than persuasive, not only 
because Rule Beta is intuitively plausible but also because in the end the 
conditional analysis of “could have done otherwise” is itself implausible 
(86–92).
One of the most interesting parts of Free Will is Mawson’s discussion 
of the burden of proof with regard to Incompatibilism (57–64). While In-
compatibilism is not an immediate datum of our everyday experience, we 
do start out holding it as a basic belief. The basicality of this belief is re-
flected in our immediate reaction to a thought experiment in which scien-
tists discover an Earth-like planet in another universe with creatures that 
look and behave exactly like us. The scientists also inform us that in the 
universe of this planet the initial conditions of the Big Bang and the laws 
of nature causally determine everything that happens thereafter, down to 
the smallest details. When we reflect about whether the creatures on this 
planet are morally responsible, we conclude that they are not (34). Our 
conclusion indicates that we believed Incompatibilism unconsciously all 
along and the thought experiment merely brings this unconscious belief 
into consciousness. The thought experiment is not an argument for the 
belief but exposes its existence. The thought experiment shows the belief 
in Incompatibilism is basic.
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But, asks Mawson, is this belief in Incompatibilism properly basic? We 
can, he says, reason that if Incompatibilism is true, then belief in it is prop-
erly basic. After all, the kinds of things that make it true, if it is true, are 
fundamental metaphysical relationships concerning modality and moral 
responsibility, and because of the fundamental character of these relation-
ships, we do not hold beliefs about something more fundamental from 
which we could infer a belief in Incompatibilism. Thus, while it is plau-
sible to contend that Incompatibilism is true because Ultimate Authorship 
(see below) requires the falsity of determinism and moral responsibility 
requires Ultimate Authorship, our belief that moral responsibility implies 
Ultimate Authorship is not knowable with greater certainty than Incom-
patibilism. Moreover, while the Consequence Argument is an argument 
for Incompatibilism, it is hard for even proponents of the Consequence 
Argument to present its premises as more obvious than Incompatibilism 
itself. Something like the Consequence Argument always retains an ele-
ment of artificiality about it. Thus, we cannot reasonably hope to base a 
belief in Incompatibilism on another belief.
If Incompatibilism is true, then belief that it is true is properly basic. 
Nevertheless, says Mawson, we might have a “scholar’s” interest in seeing 
if we can come up with a reason for believing Incompatibilism, and the 
Consequence Argument is such a reason. However, an interest in an argu-
ment for Incompatibilism might be heightened beyond this “scholarly” 
level and developed along the following two lines. First, if one is going to 
argue that a belief in Incompatibilism is properly basic, then one cannot 
do so without already believing in Incompatibilism, given that if Incom-
patibilism is true, then a belief in it is basic and one cannot arrive at a belief 
in its truth from an argument (because if the argument works and shows 
Incompatibilism is true, then given its truth, one already has a basic belief 
in it). Given this predicament, one might worry that one’s belief in Incom-
patibilism is a matter of good fortune and an argument would remove this 
worry. It is true that if an argument in support of Incompatibilism works, 
then one might conclude that one’s worry about its truth was unnecessary 
in the first place. But one cannot know that until one has looked at the 
argument. For one who is a philosopher, then, a scholar’s interest in an 
argument for Incompatibilism can be transformed into a personal interest. 
Second, an interest in an argument for Incompatibilism comes from a need 
to defend it against Compatibilist arguments against Incompatibilism. In 
this context, while, strictly speaking, a belief in Incompatibilism is inno-
cent until proven guilty and this is the case even if every argument on its 
behalf fails, still, if one has an argument for its truth, then, in addition to 
rebutting Compatibilist arguments against Incompatibilism, one can also 
use this argument to bolster Incompatibilism’s truth.
Consider briefly, now, everyday thought 4 (because of limitations of 
space, I omit a discussion of everyday thought 5), which Mawson says 
is perhaps the most elusive of the five everyday thought assumptions 
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about ourselves (37). According to Mawson, moral responsibility requires 
Ultimate Authorship and Ultimate Authorship requires the truth of In-
determinism (38, 40, 45, 94–95). Mawson defends an agent causationist 
understanding of Ultimate Authorship: a person performs an action only 
if he or she agent-causes that action (43, 44, 152, 154), and no action can be 
causally determined because no agent can be causally determined to agent-
cause an action (156). What an agent agent-causes includes his or her choice 
(decision) (144, 160). Moreover, a person is introspectively directly aware 
(has a direct experience) of his or her agent-causal “oomph” (158, 188).
As I indicated at the outset, Free Will is a spirited and engaging 
defense of libertarianism. However, in libertarian collegial good spirit, 
I will close with a few concerns about Mawson’s position. For example, 
given Mawson’s claim that we have a direct experience of agent-causing 
a choice, I found his treatment of our belief in the truth of Indeterminism 
puzzling. On the one hand, Mawson maintains that our belief in indeter-
minism is “not an immediate ‘datum’ of our everyday experience” (58) 
but instead “lies immediately underneath the surface of our everyday 
decision-making and reflection on it” and “is a belief that we seldom—if 
ever—raise to the surface of consciousness” (18). A “well-grounded belief 
that we could often do otherwise than whatever it is we end up doing” 
(115) comes through thought experiments like that mentioned earlier in 
this review. On the other hand, however, we have Mawson’s claim about 
our direct awareness of our undetermined agent-causal activity. It seems 
natural, then, to infer that this awareness of our agent-causal activity 
would be the solid ground for the belief in indeterminism. Moreover, if 
we immediately experience indeterministically agent-causing our choices, 
is it not most plausible to think that our belief in indeterminism is often 
fully present to consciousness?
As a libertarian, I believe Mawson is right to stress introspective aware-
ness of our actions, especially our choices. However, like Randolph Clarke 
(see endnote 36, 188), I have no introspective awareness of agent-causing 
my choices. What I am aware of is choosing for a reason, where a reason 
is a purpose for my acting. And as a libertarian, what concerns me about 
Mawson’s book is the absence of any sustained discussion of purposeful or 
teleological explanation and its relationship to agent causation of choices. 
A consideration of this issue might lead one to conclude that there is no 
need for agent causation in a libertarian account of agency. After all, even 
if we do agent-cause our choices, we still have to explain why it is that we 
do so. According to Mawson, nothing can cause an agent to agent-cause 
his or her choices. But what, then, explains this agent-causal activity? If 
it is something real that an agent does, it must have an explanation. And 
surely the most obvious explanation of it is the reason for which the agent 
chooses to act. But if the agent’s agent-causing is directly and adequately ex-
plained by a reason, why couldn’t an agent’s choosing to act be directly and 
adequately explained by the same reason, without the mediation of agent 
causation? Agent causation seems explanatorily redundant. If Mawson 
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were to respond that ultimate authorship requires that an agent have 
ultimate and direct control over what he or she does and the causally 
undetermined nature of agent-causing makes this control possible, then 
why could it not be the case that the causally undetermined nature of 
choosing makes this control possible, without agent causation? Again, agent 
causation seems explanatorily dispensible.
Though I have questions about the need for and existence of agent cau-
sation, I have no questions about the excellence of Free Will: A Guide for the 
Perplexed. It is a first-rate and thought-provoking treatment of the topic of 
freedom.
The Image in Mind: Theism, Naturalism, and the Imagination, by Charles 
Taliaferro and Jil Evans. Continuum, 2011. 213 pages. $130 (hardcover).
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Yale University.
The co-authors of this book, Taliaferro and Evans, are a professional phi-
losopher and a widely exhibited painter, respectively. That leads one to 
expect something out of the ordinary. And so it is. One doesn’t often find 
a philosopher and a painter collaborating except, now and then, in a very 
superficial way. The outcome of this collaboration is far from superficial. It 
includes black and white reproductions of six paintings by Evans.
The authors nicely state the project of their book in the opening para-
graph.
This is a book about images and imagination and their role in the greatest 
philosophical debate in the modern era: the debate over the credibility of 
theism versus naturalism. What is the theistic image of the world and how 
does it differ from the naturalist image? What is beautiful or ugly, deep or 
superficial, extravagant or empty, illuminating or stultifying, about these 
images? How do these images impede or enlarge our moral and personal 
lives? Despite the enormity of the naturalism-theism debate, there has been 
insufficient attention to the aesthetic nature of the images and imagination 
in these two profound visions of reality. (1)
Upon first reading, one wonders what the last of these five sentences has 
to do with the four that precede it. What’s the connection between a study 
of the role of images in the theism-naturalism debate and attention to the 
aesthetic nature of those images? Shortly the connection becomes clear: the 
authors argue that the aesthetic nature of the images contributes signifi-
cantly to the role the images play in the debate. The authors take a broad 
view of the aesthetic dimension of things. It consists, on their view, of “the 
affective or emotive features of objects and events,” that is, of those features 
to which we respond affectively, whether positively or negatively (38).
By “theism” the authors have in mind what they call Platonic theism. 
“Central to such an outlook is an affirmation of the intrisic goodness of 
